Moral Philosophy: Cultural Relativism
Evaluative Statements
There are two ways to talk about the world. We can describe it or evaluate it. I can say what I see out of my window, and I can say that it is beautiful (my window overlooks some tall pines, and a lake). I can describe someone kicking another person in the shins out of spite and I can evaluate the action as bad, as immoral. I can describe the police coming to arrest the drug dealer and I can evaluate the policy of arresting drug dealers.
From the above kinds of evaluative statements, the first is aesthetic, the second moral (or ethical), and the last political. Of the three, ethical conversation is perhaps the most immediately relevant philosophical topic. As Christians, we are more concerned with what is right and wrong than what is beautiful or ugly, or what is good or bad policy.
Of course, ethics is also an inescapably religious topic. I don’t mean one has to talk about religion whenever one talks about ethics, but whenever one is considering religion, one will inevitably start thinking about ethics. For example, a clear presentation of the gospel is impossible without talking about immoral actions. After all, the gospel is a presentation of the cure for our deepest problem—our sin against God.
Meta-Ethical Questions
There are many questions philosophers have about ethics. We might wonder, for example, if ethical statements are objectively true. Statements that are objectively true are true no matter what people think of them. For example, even if everyone thought it was okay to kick each other in the shins out of spite, it would still be wrong.
Second, we might wonder if there are reasons to believe moral statements. Why is it wrong to kick someone in the shins out of spite? How do we know which actions are right and which are wrong?
We might also wonder what we mean by ‘good’ or ‘bad’; ‘right’ and ‘wrong.’ If we are in particularly rebellious mood, we might even wonder why we should be good. Some people think there are things we ought not do, but don’t see why they ought not to do them. Must we be moral?
Perhaps the most prominent question on the above list asks whether statements like, “it is immoral to kick someone in the shins out of spite” are objectively true. The view that there are no objectively true ethical statements is called moral anti-realism. The view that there are objectively true ethical statements is called moral realism.
Cultural Relativism
A popular anti-realist view says that statements like “it is wrong to kick someone in the shins out of spite” is true for some cultures and not for others. Take any moral rule and ask: from whence does it come? One plausible answer is that it comes from one’s culture. Now, most people agree that to some degree we acquire moral principles from those who teach them to us, but cultural relativists go a step further. They suggest that there is nothing more to the normative nature of those principles that what our cultures decide. For example, according to Ruth Benedict, “Normality…is culturally defined.”[1] It follows from Benedict’s view that there is no moral principle which necessarily applies to everyone, everywhere, and at every time.
Why might one hold to such a view? One might think the following is true: Beliefs about what is right and wrong vary from culture to culture. And since we have no way to tell which culture is correct (ours or theirs), the following is also true: What is really right and wrong varies from culture to culture.
The argument isn’t good because it is not the case that it follows from beliefs varying from one culture to another that what is really the case varies from culture to culture. If that were true, then there could be no false beliefs! But that’s highly implausible, to say the least.
What’s Wrong with Cultural Relativism?
There are some powerful objections to relativism. First, relativism is incompatible with moral progress. When we shake off one set of moral rules and adopt another it is because we think what we are doing is wrong. But, if relativism is true, then this cannot be the reason to adopt a new set of moral rules. As one objector remarks,
If the majority of our society approves of slavery at one time and disapproves of it at another time, ethical relativism cannot say that we have shaken off an incorrect moral view and acquired a correct one. It must say, instead, that we have simply gone from having one correct view…to having a different correct view.[2]
Second, cultural relativists have no available grounds for criticizing cultures different to their own. For example, on what grounds could a relativist criticize the Nazi program of killing the Jews? They may express their distaste or contrast their own culture with Nazi culture, but they could not object to the practice.
A final objection comes from Louis Pojman. Pojman does not set out to show that relativism is false. He merely argues that relativism cannot be cultural. It can only be a matter of an individual’s perspective.[3]
Pojman makes a distinction between subjectivism and conventionalism. Subjectivism is the view that the individual subject is the arbiter of morality; he or she is free to follow his or her preference. Conventionalism asserts that morality is decided by a group of subjects who, to a great extent, agree on their values. These agreed concepts are then canonized into a legal code.
Now, consider two groups, group A and group B. It follows from conventionalism that A cannot critique B. They have no moral grounds to do so. If one supposes that there is a moral principle by which A can critique B, then it is not a conventional principle.
Now consider, group A. Group A is a coherent group. But why suppose it is itself not made from groups. If so, then the same dilemma emerges. Say within group A, one has group A1, A2, A3. Since those groups count as convention-producers, they have no grounds to critique each other. Although it sounds weird, in principle, a group could have a member of one. An individual can count as a group. And since there is no principle by which we determine a group’s size, if we continue the logic, we are left with individuals. But then we do not have conventionalism. Instead, we have subjectivism (we do what is right in our own eyes and have no grounds to criticize anyone else). But what possible reason do we have for accepting subjectivism?
Perhaps the only available reason to be a subjectivist is to avoid being intolerant or imposing one’s view on other people. The trouble with this reason is that it is quite possible to imagine (and observe actually happening in history) people who believe that their view ought to be imposed on others. And, given the force of some people’s personality, it is quite possible and frequently actual (again, from history and current affairs) that people gain power and then use force—even violence—to impose their views on others. According to the subjectivist, there isn’t anything immoral in doing so as long as the actions are the result of a person’s preference. Hence, subjectivism has nothing going for it.
References
[1] Ruth Benedict, “Anthropology and the Abnormal” in Moral Philosophy: A Reader, eds. Louis Pojman and Peter Tramel (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003), 36.
[2] Howard-Snyder, “Christianity and Ethics” in Reason for the Hope Within, ed. Michael Murray (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 377.
[3] Louis Pojman, “A Defense of Ethical Objectivism” in Moral Philosophy: A Reader, eds. Louis Pojman and Peter Tramel (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003), 38–51.