Consequentialist Ethics

Dr Ben Holloway, Assistant Professor of Philosophy and History of Ideas at Southeastern Baptist Seminary

To better think about our moral lives, it is worth considering what philosophers have to say about what makes an action right or wrong. In this post, I want to examine a prevalent moral theory—consequentialism—and consider whether it stands up to scrutiny.

Actions and Consequences

Actions have moral statuses. Some actions ought to be performed; others ought not be performed. Other actions are permissible: they are neither obligated of us nor forbidden. Moral theories attempt to tell us what makes these actions have their statuses.

According to consequentialists, what gives an action its moral status is the value of its consequences. To think of actions in terms of their consequences is very normal. We frequently make choices based on what we believe brings about the best results. It is how I decided what to have for breakfast and when I shall return from the office today.

Consequentialists in ethics take this phenomenon normatively. They suggest that the moral status of an action is wholly determined by the value of its consequence.

The first question for consequentialists is: what is the value of the consequence in question? What kinds of goods and bads are we talking about? According to Jeremy Bentham, the good is pleasure and the bad is pain. As he remarks,

“Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure.” [1] (Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in MP, 120).

For Bentham, what determines the moral status of an action is whether pleasure is maximized, and pain minimized. To apply his theory, prior to an action, we should calculate the outcome, weighing the quantity of predicted pleasure versus the quantity of predicted pain. He called this calculation, the principle of utility:

“By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the part whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness.” [2] (Bentham, 121)

If we accept the value of pleasure, Bentham has a plausible policy based on this premise. An activity can be assigned a value in terms of the resultant pleasure or pain. You want pleasure to outweigh pain.

According to Bentham, various factors play into our calculations: One can calculate the intensity, duration, and certainty of pleasure or pain for various actions. One can also calculate the productiveness and extent of the benefits of an action. Doing so is supposed to provide a set of
criteria for calculating the moral status of any action.

Competent Judges

An objection to Bentham’s hedonism might be: “Isn’t this what pigs do? But we are more than pigs.” If pleasure is all we must go by, then what is the point of seeking goods that take time and effort to obtain? Why not just live as animals and be happy?

In his work, Utilitarianism, John Stewart Mill suggests that humans are capable of a higher kind of happiness than mere sensual pleasure. [3] Pigs eat indiscriminately but humans have the capacity to pursue a higher satisfaction, so we can choose to eat selectively.

What we need in order to achieve a capacity for higher goods is a competent judge, a person who is very experienced in a kind of pleasure and can inform us of the best of the kind (the highest pleasures). For example, movie or theater critics are experienced and knowledgeable about their field. The critic can inform us of what to watch thereby ensuring we are exposed to a higher pleasure. Further, critics who obtain a taste for higher goods can train others to appreciate them. For example, music appreciation classes are aimed at training people to appreciate complex musical pieces.

There is still a problem with utilitarianism as just described. As John Hospers argues in Human Conduct: An Introduction to the Problem of Ethics, according to utilitarianism, one chooses to act according to what will bring about the most pleasure. [4] But how can we anticipate what effect the action has and consider all the options? Since we cannot see the future and we aren’t experts, what we think will be the best consequence may not be. Hospers argues that we should remove the task of calculating the merits of each action by imposing set of rules that everyone must obey. On this view, we need the competent judge to set the rules according to his expertise. Those rules, when adhered to, are supposed to work to obtain the greatest good for the greatest number of people. The latter view is commonly called rule utilitarianism, replacing the former view, act utilitarianism.

Objections to Consequentialism

Many objections can be raised against consequentialist ethics. Some philosophers have argued that there must be more to what makes an action right or wrong than merely the consequences. Hence, consequentialism is at least an incomplete moral theory. Others have argued that there are good reasons to reject the theory outright.

In The Right and the Good, W. D. Ross argues that pleasure is only one among other intrinsic goods. An intrinsic good is a good that requires nothing else to make it so. It is good regardless of other factors. [5]

References

[1] Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (London: Printed for T. Payne, and Son, at the Mews Gate, 1789), 1.

[2] Ibid., 2.

[3] John Stewart Mill, Utilitarianism in On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford University Press, 1991), 131–204.

[4] John Hospers, Human Conduct; an Introduction to the Problems of Ethics (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World 9161).

[5] W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002).

[6] Sterling Harwood, “Eleven Objections to Utilitarianism” in Moral Philosophy: A Reader, ed. Louis Pojman and Peter Tramel (Hackett, 2003), 189.