Aristotle (384 – 322 BC)
Split from Plato
Aristotle didn’t follow his teacher in everything. In contrast with Plato, Aristotle thought that form and matter cannot exist separately. Whereas Plato said that matter depends on form (see my previous post for Plato’s view), Aristotle says that form depends on matter. Forms are not eternal; they only exist if the concrete object exists. If there are no dinosaurs, then there is no form of dinosaur. Aristotle’s metaphysic is called hylomorphism (morphus is Greek for form and hylas is Greek for matter).
Natures
Aristotle conceives of reality as a set of powers. According to Aristotle, things have potentials that can be actualized. For example, an acorn has the potential to be an oak tree. The nature of a thing determines which potentials it has. So, because of its nature, an acorn lacks the potential to grow wings and fly. Natures are taken to explain the behavior of things. For example, if asked why water flows downhill, the answer would likely be, “that’s just what water does.” Its nature explains its behavior. For Aristotle, the end or telos is contained within the nature of the entity. Aristotle calls a thing’s end its entelechy.
The Westminster Catechism employs the idea of a human nature when, in answer to the question, “what is the chief end of man?” it says, “to glorify God and enjoy him forever.” Such a claim assumes that there is some end or telos appropriate to human nature. If there is, then it applies to everyone. Contemporary objectors to this idea might deny such universal purposes and suggest that purposes are really just what individual humans desire in life.
Change
For Aristotle, change is a matter of something actualizing its potential. If something is potentially something, then it isn’t that thing. My coffee has the potential to lessen in quantity (by me drinking it) or get cold (by me forgetting to drink it). But while it sits hot on my desk it is neither of those things. [1]
Consider the debate over human life. Is a human fetus a potential or actual human life? The fetus (little one) is potentially a star athlete, a corpse, or a mother of three. It is actually none of these things. Indeed, if something is potentially something, then it is not actually that thing.
If a fetus is a potential human life, then it is not a human life. If it is okay to kill beings which are not human lives and a fetus is a potential human life, then it is okay to kill a fetus. So, if given an opportunity, Christians should argue that the fetus is actually—not potentially—a human life. Since unjustifiably killing an actual human life is wrong, killing a fetus is wrong.
If everything is changing, then everything is actualizing its potential. My coffee is actualizing its potential to be cold as I ignore it on my desk (so focused am I on writing this post). But it couldn’t get cold if it wasn’t being cooled by the air. Same for every other actualizing of a potential. Potentials don’t actualize unless there is some actualizer, something already actualized that causes the change. But if that’s true and everything is changing, there could be no change. One would need one thing that has no potentials, a completely actualized being. This thing is called the first cause, or unmoved mover. In his synthesis of Christian theology and Aristotelian metaphysics, Thomas Aquinas employed this idea to great effect, concluding a series of arguments for the first cause adding, “and this we call God.”
Virtues
Once one has the hang of Aristotle’s ideas on potentials and actuals, they can be applied to human life. In the opening sentence of his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle writes,
Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason, the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. [2]
According to Aristotle, all actions have ends. For the one performing the action, the end is a good of some sort. Goods are either valuable because they lead to a further good or because they are good in themselves. Thus, there must be at least one “chief” (or ‘supreme’) good to which human actions aim.
So, what is the supreme good for humans? According to Aristotle, “it is happiness.” [3] Happiness (eudaimonia) is not a state (such as feeling contentment). Rather, it is an activity. [4] It is the actualization of human potentials according to their nature.
How do we become virtuous? Aristotle argues that virtues are acquired by repeated actions. Just as practicing an instrument leads one to play it well, practicing morally good actions results in obtaining a virtue. Once one has acquired the virtues, one has obtained happiness, the actualization of the potentials we have according to our nature.
How do we know what virtues are? Aristotle thinks we can observe human life and establish what kinds of activities are virtuous and which are vicious. He writes,
Virtue…is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by reason, and by that reason by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it. [5]
The two destroyers of virtue are excess and deficiency. Too little or too much, and one will miss the mark. Applied to particular situations, virtue is a disposition to the intermediate.
Conclusion
Aristotle’s range of topics is truly remarkable. He wrote on biology, physics, logic, rhetoric, theology, metaphysics, ethics, politics, and art. In all his work, he displayed a systematic approach very unlike Plato’s. Whereas Plato tended to move quickly from one subject to another, Aristotle devised precise taxonomies and focused on one domain at a time. The result is an enormously helpful starting point for many philosophical and scientific topics. It also formed the basis for a highly influential philosophical theology developed by Thomas Aquinas in the Middle Ages.
References
- I got this illustration from Edward Feser, Five Proofs of the Existence of God (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2017), 17–21. ↩︎
- Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. David Ross (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 1094a, 3. ↩︎
- Aristotle, Ethics, 1095a19, 5. ↩︎
- Aristotle, Ethics, 1098a16, 12. ↩︎
- Aristotle, Ethics, 1107a1, 31. ↩︎