Free Will and Determinism
It is 10am Eastern Time on June 3, 2024. I just raised my hand. Could I have refrained? Is there something that happened prior to me raising my hand that made it impossible for me not to? Did God decide in eternity past that I would raise my hand at this time? If so, how could I have raised it freely? If not, how could God be sovereign over all things? Answers to these questions, and many others, depend on one’s views on determinism.
According to determinism, for everything that happens, there are antecedent conditions such that, given those conditions, nothing else could occur. According to the determinist, the antecedent conditions are prior to and sufficient for everything that happens. So, according to the determinist, if I raise my hand at 10am on June 3, 2024, there are antecedent conditions such that, given those conditions, I could not have done otherwise.
Divine (or theological) determinism is a species of determinism according to which the antecedent condition is God’s decree. God’s decree is something like an enormous book of sentences written by God that are true about the world he creates. God writes the book before he brings the world into being. God then brings about all the happenings described by the sentences. He never deviates from his decree. Everything happens exactly as he plans (Isaiah 46:10-11). So, among his decrees is the decree that I will raise my hand at 10am on June 3, 2024. Given his decree, there is no way I could have done otherwise.
One does not have to be a theist to be a determinist. For example, one can hold that, for everything that happens, given the total state of the world and the governing laws of nature, nothing else could occur.
One also doesn’t have to believe that if determinism is true, we can predict precisely what people will do. Many people try to predict human behaviour by examining all the causal factors that bring about our actions. This is an impossible task. Each individual human being is unique, with a unique set of desires, aims, and interests. We might get a rough idea of what many people are likely to do but, given the complexity of human life, it is impossible to be precise.
Notice also that the determinist does not say that whatever happens couldn’t have failed to happen no matter what. That view is called fatalism. Instead, the determinist says that given certain conditions that precede what happens, nothing else could occur. If those conditions had been different, then something else would have happened. So, if God had decreed that I do not raise my hand at 10am on June 3, 2024, then I would not have done it.
Indeterminists complain that determinism has some unpalatable consequences. They argue that if determinism is true, then the actions of human beings are not freely performed. Some suggest that without free will, we are little more than robots operating according to a prewritten ‘program.’ After all, I had no say in what God puts in his decree. If not, then I can’t really be in control of any of my actions.
Indeterminists argue that if human beings don’t have free will, we can’t be morally responsible for our actions. Suppose you are found guilty of robbing a bank. You ask the judge why he is punishing you. He should point out that you are morally responsible for the crime. He should be able to say, “You could have done otherwise. Nothing determined you to rob the bank. Hence, it is right to punish you.” But if determinism is true, it appears that he couldn’t give a reason for thinking you are responsible for the crime.
An indeterminist view of free will is either called libertarian or incompatibilist free will, incompatibilist because free will is incompatible with determinism. According to an incompatibilist, for an action to be genuinely free, it must not be determined. There must be no antecedent condition such that, given that condition, one could not do otherwise. So, there can be no prior condition that ensures that I raised my hand at 10am on June 3, 2024. I could have refrained from raising it. It was up to me. That’s not to say there cannot be influences on any of my actions. I could be raising my hand for a reason such as needing to stretch, but such a reason cannot be decisive if the action is to be genuinely free. I must be able to do otherwise.
Theists opposed to divine determinism also argue that if God causes all future events and some of those events are evil, then God is morally responsible for that evil. Since God cannot be morally responsible for evil without failing to be good, determinism must be false.
It might be imagined that anyone holding to determinism must be forced to surrender any concept of free will. Those who do so are called hard determinists. According to this view, we don’t possess free will of any kind. However, many hold to soft determinism and think that free will is compatible with it. Unsurprisingly, this kind of free will is called compatibilist free will.
According to those who hold to a compatibilist view of free will, an action is free if and only if the agent performs an action according to his or her volition (desire). As Paul Manata writes:
“we are free when (1) we are able to do what we want or desire to do, and (2) when there is an absence of constraints keeping us from doing what we want to do, or forcing us to do what we don’t want to do” (Paul Manata, Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology, 34).
Suppose you are found guilty of robbing a bank, but you find out that determinism is true. You may try to get yourself off the hook by telling the judge that, given the antecedent conditions, you could not have done otherwise. Hence, you cannot be punished for the crime. But suppose the judge is a compatibilist. A compatibilist judge may reply by asking, “did you want to rob the bank?” If the answer is affirmative, that is all that is required to hold you responsible. Of course, he may also say something snarky like, “yes, you were predetermined to rob the bank. Unfortunately, I find myself predetermined to send you to jail!”
Suppose, you reply, “no, I was compelled against my will to rob the bank. Someone held a gun to my head and told me to rob the bank or else.” In such a case, the judge ought not to punish you even though you robbed the bank. In this case, the robbery was not carried out freely – you were forced against your desire. Hence, it would not be right to hold you morally responsible.
Christians remain divided over which version of free will is correct. One should notice that so far, neither view is incoherent. There isn’t anything illogical about either view as I have portrayed them. Hence, which is the better view will be decided by other factors.
One of those issues is the consistency of one’s view with other beliefs about God and his world. In this regard, both sides will have to overcome significant hurdles. On the one hand, incompatibilists will need a solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge and human free will. If God, prior to me raising my hand, believed that I would raise it, I could not have done otherwise without making that belief false. But God is omniscient, which at least entails that God cannot have a false belief. How can God both know the future actions of free creatures yet not have determined those same actions?
On the other hand, compatibilists have to explain how it is possible that God is all-good and all-powerful if he determined all the evil in the world. If one appeals to incompatibilist free will, one has a ready answer. God cannot determine free actions. Hence, if we sin, God can’t make us refrain from sinning without taking away our freedom. But what can a determinist say? It seems there can be no reason that God couldn’t make a world without evil. After all, he is the one determining all our actions. Surely, he could determine that none of those actions are evil.
Both sides have offered answers to both problems (and many other problems besides). Suffice to say, there is no easy way. Whichever way one goes, there are difficulties and costs. Nonetheless, Christian philosophers aren’t interested in easy. In some of the ensuing articles, I will show how incompatibilists and compatibilists overcome these hurdles.
For a good overview of various views try, Predestination & Free Will: Four Views of Divine Sovereignty & Human Freedom edited by David Basinger and Randall Basinger. Paul Manata wrote a very good introduction to reformed views called Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology. It is available online for free here.