Miracles
According to Paul, the resurrection of Jesus Christ is a vital component of the Christian faith. Without it, his preaching and our faith are useless (1 Cor 15:14).
If it is so important—as we think it is—we ought to be able to show that it is reasonable to believe.
If asked why we believe the resurrection of Jesus happened, we will say that people who saw it wrote about it, and we believe them based on their testimony. Ordinarily, we accept claims people make sincerely when they know what they are talking about.
However, sometimes the claim may seem odd enough to warrant questioning. If a good friend says that he saw a pig fly, we will waste no time in disbelieving his testimony even if our friend was ordinarily a reliable source of information. To some, the idea that someone could rise from the dead is on par with a claim to have seen a pig fly. No matter how reliable the witness, no time should be wasted on considering the claim.
The issue is broader than Jesus’ resurrection. It is about all miraculous events. If it isn’t rational to believe in miracles, then belief in the resurrection isn’t rational either.
The most prominent criticism of the rationality of belief in miracles came from David Hume (1711-1776). Hume strongly objected to the rationality of belief in miracles and, consequently, in resurrections. Hume argued that we should treat claims to have seen a miracle as so implausible as to be disbelieved even if we hear about them from otherwise reliable witnesses.
Hume’s overall case depended on showing that we never have sufficient reason to believe that a miracle has occurred. If his case is strong enough, then Christians would have to give up their beliefs in resurrections, miraculous healings, and the parting of the red sea.
In this post, I shall try to show what is wrong with Hume’s argument and conclude that belief in miracles is not irrational. I am largely summarising the case made by John Earman in his excellent book, Hume’s Abject Failure: The Argument Against Miracles.
What is a miracle? According to Hume, a miracle is “a violation of the laws of nature.” On the surface of it, the definition seems appropriate. However, there are two problems: first, it is not clear that those who believe in miracles define them that way. Why think of a miracle as a violation of a law? Surely if God causes an event to happen, he isn’t violating anything. They are his laws. So, surely he has the power to suspend them.
Second, Hume does not deploy the definition in his argument. If the laws of nature are exceptionless regularities, then miracles are logically impossible. But Hume does not argue that miracles cannot occur. So, Hume is employing a different definition for his argument.
So, why does Hume think we should not believe in miracles? A clue is found in what Hume says about believing the report of a miracle such as a resurrection. Hume says that the reports of the resurrection are not to be believed “because that has never been observed in any age or country.” This implies that Hume assumes another concept of miracle, one that does not entail that they are impossible, just that they are extremely unlikely given prior observations.
Consider many of our ordinary beliefs. We arrive at them by observing two things together and coming to believe that where there is one, there will be the other. If I eat a clementine, I expect it to be sweet. I have come to associate sweetness with clementines. Similarly, we associate dead people with staying dead, water with taking the path of least resistance, and having a leg amputated with never having that limb back. If we can’t rely on such associations, we’d be left with a limitless set of beliefs many or most of which would be false. But if we want to remain rational, we ought to trust our association capacities. I will do so the next time I eat a clementine.
The statement, “no human being ever comes back to life from the dead,” says that, as far as we know, no one can rise from the dead. Dead people are so associated with staying dead that it would be irrational to associate otherwise. Nonetheless, it is contradicted by miracle statements such as, “Jesus Christ came back to life from the dead.” Hume argues that though the latter might be true (it is logically possible), it would require a vast amount of evidence to believe it. The evidence would have to overcome all of our previous experiences. Since no testimony from even the most credible of witnesses could overcome the original statement, no one is rational to believe in miracles. Here is how Hume puts it:
A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined (Enquiry, 10.11)
As Hume argues, his claim depends on how one determines the likelihood of the occurrence of an event. How likely is it, given our past experiences, that the sun will not rise tomorrow? The likelihood is low. We have not been let down yet and it is highly improbable that the sun will stop rising in the morning. If we count up the number of days the sun has risen, we can infer that it will rise on all the other days. As Hume writes,
All probability, then, supposes an opposition of experiments and observations, where the one side is found to overbalance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence, proportioned to the superiority (Enquiry, 10.4).
One can clearly see the argument: if no one has seen dead people come back to life, one has very little reason to believe a report of a resurrection. If all the dead people observed have not come back to life, then the probability of it occurring is as good as 0. Hence, says Hume, claims to have witnessed a miracle can safely be ignored.
How might one respond to Hume’s argument?
One might suggest that we can provide evidence for a miracle that can outweigh Hume’s evidence from experience. It is not clear, however, that the evidence would be sufficient, at least for Hume. Hume asks us to imagine that the Queen’s courtiers report the resurrection of her majesty (Hume is speaking of Elizabeth I). Such trustworthy witnesses and so many of them surely count as sufficient evidence for Hume. However, Hume replies that even the most credible witnesses in the land could not overturn past experiences of dead people staying dead.
An alternative strategy is defended by John Earman in his book, Hume’s Abject Failure. Earman argues that the cost of Hume’s position is too high. By ruling out any testimony of a miracle, Hume will have to rule out testimony that he would otherwise accept, namely any testimony from scientists about a discovery.
Interestingly, Hume himself offers the tools to criticise him. Hume tells an imaginary story of an Indian Prince. In the story, the prince is visited by one of his subjects who has been to a far-off land. While there, the prince’s subject sees ice. The subject cannot show the prince any ice since it would have melted on the journey. The subject travels back to India and informs the prince. The prince is amazed at such a thing. How can water turn to a solid?
The objection shows that if presumptive statements yield a 0 probability of miracles, then any previously unobserved phenomena would be ruled out. Thus, if the prince was to adhere to the rule, he would be entirely rational to ignore the testimony of his subject. However, surely the prince should consider the testimony of his subject. If all such testimonies are ignored, then how can anyone make a new discovery. Indeed, doesn’t science itself depend on the discovery of new states of affairs previous thought never to occur? As Earman writes, “Unless testimonial evidence is allowed to overcome prior improbabilities, there is no way to underwrite the sorts of inferences made in everyday life and in science” (Earman, Hume’s Abject Failure, 33).
Hume recognises the problem and attempts to construct a few replies. In his first reply, Hume argues that though the phenomenon of ice is not conformable with the prince’s experience, it is not contrary to it. However, it is not clear what the difference between conformable and contrary is supposed to be. According to Hume, that which is not conformable to experience is contrary to experience, but he does not tell us how they are different.
Hume’s second reply involves another distinction. He argues that a marvel is not the same as a miracle. Turning water into ice is a marvel but turning death into life is a miracle. Again, however, this is a distinction without a difference.
Hume’s third reply is to suggest that the passing of water to ice is similar to other phenomena the prince has seen. This is a much more plausible reply. Perhaps the prince has seen other changes such as water turning into steam. When he hears about water turning into ice, he is surprised, but he can see how it is plausible. In contrast, if he hears about a person coming back to life from the dead, then he would not have any similar analogy. There is nothing like coming back from the dead!
However, in order for Hume to use this argument, he would need to modify his rule. He would have to say that there are two kinds of miracles. First, there are those miracles for which there is an analogical event that provides some background knowledge, and which increases the probability of the putative miracle above zero. Second, there are those miracles without such background knowledge, rendering the probability of them occurring at zero.
However, if the criterion for background knowledge is ‘analogy’ then more things would count as analogies than Hume would like. Candidates for resurrection analogies include other ‘phase-changing’ events: conception, birth, near-death experiences, blackouts, catatonic states, or Vedic trances. If Hume thinks any of these things are not analogous to resurrection, then he owes us an account of why. It is very difficult to see how he could do so. Hence, the resurrection counts as a miracle for which we have some analogies. Just as the prince is justified in considering the testimonial evidence for water freezing, we can be justified in considering the evidence of witnesses who tell us they saw a man rise from the dead.
It should be noted that believers don’t base their beliefs in the resurrection on analogies with other phase-changes in human life, but if Hume continues to stick to his strict criteria, the cost of ignoring witnesses to a miracle turns out to be science itself—too high a price even for Hume. One cannot rule out a resurrection merely due to its infrequency. One should at least warrant that it is rationally permissible to examine the evidence provided by the witnesses. As it happens, we have very credible witnesses whose records are with us in the gospels.